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Mary C. Daane 
W hen language instructors teach from the conviction that "words form the floor, walls, and ceiling of our existence" (N ouwen, 1 98 1 ,  p. 3 1  ) , from 
a recognition that language is both the foundation and reflection of students' 
reality, value systems, experiences, and ways of being in the world, instructors 
receive and evaluate their students '  di scourse as far more significant than 
accumulations of discrete achievement skills .  This constructivist (Ortony 1 979) 
or experientialist (Lakoff & Johnson, 1 980) perspective sensitizes teachers to a 
holistic view of their students '  linguistic lives;  often constructivist teachers 
assign activities that encourage students to use "expressive" language, language 
that is  "close to the self' and gives signals about [students] as well as signals 
about [ s tudents ' ]  topic [ s ] "  (Bri tton, 1 9 82 ,  pp. 96-97) .  By doing this ,  the 
"constructivist" teacher becomes privy to the recurrent themes and metaphors 
by which students render their identities. 
In recent years epistemic theory in many disciplines has drifted from 
taxonomy to "linguisticality" (Foucault, 1 973 ), resulting in a burgeoning of 
publications on metaphor. Surprisingly, though, the trend has given rise to very little 
discussion about the significance of metaphor in writing theory. In fact, Seitz's 
"Composition's Misunderstanding of Metaphor" ( 1 99 1 )  notes a paradox in the field's 
persistence in viewing metaphor as something to be isolated, controlled, even 
expunged from student writing and discussions about writing, for the sake of clarity. 
As Booth ( 1978) reminds us, "The quality of any culture is in large part the quality of 
the metaphorists that it creates and sustains" (p. 72). 
Metaphors help thinkers and writers forge new connections, relevancies, 
realities and, at the same time, control the way they view the world. For this 
reason the discussion of metaphor should no longer be closeted in the literature 
class; a theoretical understanding of language, metaphor, and the reality they 
embrace is as essential to contemporary composition pedagogy as it is has al­
ways been to poetry and metaphysics.  Those who take language seriously and 
acknowledge its power to change lives and, consequently, the world, recognize 
that composition classes must be more than laboratories to dissect syntax and 
paragraph patterns;  composition classes must become studios where students'  
inchoate potentials can be transformed by the magic of metaphor from the 
unspeakable within to an articulate without. 
Basic Philosophies of Language 
Since the time of Aristotle and throughout the history of Western thought, 
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"objectivi sm" (Johnson, 1 987) has dominated philosophical approaches to 
language. Briefly, the objectivist understanding holds that language relates in a 
one-to-one, precise manner to a reality that is disembodied or separate and out­
side of human thought, i .e . ,  words have exact meanings that fit the properties of 
the world we live in. Collaterally, the objectivists consider knowledge fixed and 
accessible; for them, "the cat sat on the mat" means one and only one thing to all 
competent speakers of English. Objectivity is  possible and necessary for reason; 
absolute and knowable truth exists and may be derived by impersonal and 
rational analysis .  Moreover, the vocabularies of philosophy and science are 
accurate, and the formulations of these disciplines can correctly describe and 
predict the universe. 
In the twentieth century an alternate understanding of language evolved from 
the work of such philosophers as Kant ( 1781 1 1 965), Ricoeur ( 1976), Vygotsky 
( 1962), and Whorf ( 1 956). This new approach is  aphorized in Wittgenstein's 
( 1 953)  often cited statement, "The limits of my language are the limits of my 
world."  This new point of view led to the now widely-held conviction that the 
language we generate both creates and communicates a constructed reality, 
shaping our value systems and our ways of being in the world. Indeed, accepting 
the breach between the world and the word accounts for the postmodern view of 
an indeterminate reality. 
Those who hold this view of reality argue that truth is a product of our cultur­
ally determined thought system and our particular experiences within that 
culture, not of some absolute or neutral set of pan-human concepts. Rorty 's  ( 1 990) 
comment, "Truth is  simply a compliment paid to sentences seen to be paying 
their way" (as  c ited in Klepp, 1 990,  p. 1 1 8) ,  makes this very point.  For 
constructivists, objectivity is  not nullified but understood to remain possible 
within the framework of cultural supports and limitations. From this stance, ra­
tionality appears to rest on both logic and imagination. Therefore, a set of infor­
mational propositions may yield many validly reasoned conclusions that will vary 
individually depending on the experiences, imagination, and available linguistic 
resources. Accordingly, any individual 's  understanding of "the cat sat on the mat" 
is shaped by earlier personal encounters with, and cultural perspectives on, both 
c ats  and mat s .  Philosophers who acknowledge the human propens ity for 
"seeing-as" (Wittgenstein, 1 95 3 ,  p. 1 93 )  are known as constructivists  or 
experientialists .  They view language and imagination as endowments that 
l iberate us from the constraints of absolute meaning and thereby elevate 
linguistic expression beyond the skill category to a "phenomenon of freedom" 
(Steiner, 1 989, p. 1 5 1 ) . 
Constructivism and Metaphor 
In order to derive a correspondence between metaphor and cosmology, I settle 
on one point of view as to how metaphors operate or what they do. There are 
generally three positions on this issue. 
First, the substitution view considers metaphors "fuzzy and vague, inessen­
tial frills, appropriate for the purposes of the politician and of the poet, but not 
for those of the scientist, who is attempting to furnish an objective description of 
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physical reality" (Ortony, 1 979, p. 2). This objectivist approach holds that "meta­
phors are essentially linguistic ornaments for which their more prosaic equiva­
lents can be readily substituted" (Ortony, 1 985 , p. 1 53). In that view, Yeats '  ( 1 927/ 
1 962) lines from "Sailing to Byzantium" : "An aged man is  but a paltry thing,/ A 
tattered coat upon a stick . . .  ," are simply an unnecessary embellishment having 
the semantic equivalent of the literal, drab, but more precise, "An old man is 
insignificant, frayed, brittle and frail" (p. 95). 
A second position on metaphor, the comparative view, has its roots in 
Aristotelian philosophy. Aristotle in "On Poetics" defines metaphor as "the intuitive 
perception of the similarity in dissimilars." This belief that metaphor allows language 
users to propose otherwise similarities differs little from the substitution view, for the 
comparison view finds "every metaphor to be a condensed or elliptic simile" (Richards, 
1 936, pp. 35-36). Thus, the comparison view, just another spin on the substitution 
view, would find Yeats' line an expendable, implied simile approximating, "An old 
man looks like a tattered coat hanging on a stick." 
A third view of metaphor, one that is consistent with the constructivist view, holds 
that the terms of a metaphor interact to set off a chain of associations that give rise to 
an altogether new meaning, one that conjures far more than the meaning constituted 
by the original terms .  This view, arising from Richards '  discussion of the 
"interanimation of words" (as cited in Black, 1 979), holds that new meaning arises, 
not from the words themselves, but from a new or startling juxtaposition of words. 
The interactionist position on Yeats' line would hold that readers bring their own 
associations, thoughts, feelings, reminiscences about old men, tattered coats, and sticks; 
thus, individuals '  interpretations of the line will vary. The interactionist view is  
consistent with contemporary reader response theory in describing meaning, not as 
captured ideas inalterably preserved by the page, but as variable incantations at the 
juncture of the word, the reader, the culture, and the moment. 
In the constructivist universe, both the substitution and the comparison views 
are inadequate, for if all language is  seen as a reflection of the user's view of 
reality, and if an objective reality is  understood to be a myth, then all language is 
seen to be more or less removed from the objects and phenomena to which it 
refers . If nothing in the lexicon conforms directly and absolutely to reality, then 
everything in the lexicon is a metaphor for that reality. Thus the difference 
between literal and figurative language is quantitative rather than qualitative. 
The issue is  not whether or not an expression is  metaphorical but whether it is 
metaphorical enough for the average, competent language user to recognize its 
metaphoricity. Black ( 1 979) and others have differentiated between "live" and 
"dead" metaphors. A live metaphor is one that is syntactically jarring enough to 
catch the attention of a reader or listener. On the other hand, dead metaphors are 
those that have become so automatic that average users barely note their 
metaphoricity; head of the family, arm of the chair, and foot of the bed are 
everyday metaphorical expressions we rarely note as such. 
Metaphor and Reality 
Several commentators have taken exception to the objectivist position that 
finds metaphors "unimportant, deviant, and parasitic on 'normal usage"' (Ortony, 
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1979,  p. 2) .  Levin ( 1 979) maintains that when we respond to metaphorical 
constructions, we do not construe "the utterance so that it makes sense of the 
world, we construe the world so as to make sense of the utterance" (p. 1 3 1 ) .  
Encountering a metaphor, w e  complete a quick mental check o f  the meanings of 
the terms and conjure an imaginary reality to make that anomalous expression 
sensible. Thus, the notion that metaphors are aberrant expressions is  superseded 
by the idea that the language is impeccable;  j u st the facts are deranged.  
Metaphors are to be taken literally; "They mean what they say-what gives is  
the world" (p. 13 1 ) .  
For those who see truth a s  a matter o f  "fitting words t o  the world" (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1 980, p. 1 96), concession to a new reality can imply falsehood and lies. 
Empson ( 1 951) noted that the truth or falsity of literary works is  not the issue; 
when contracting with a text, readers are expected to rearrange the world to match 
the writer 's  creation. 
A prototype of the notion that metaphor creates truth was reified in the works 
of literary Romantics .  Coleridge's  "willing suspension of disbelief" (as cited in 
Salingar, 1966, p. 89), the condition necessary for the reader 's  transaction with 
the text, and Keats' ( 1 8 17/ 1967) "negative capability" (p. 399), the tolerance for 
the ambiguity of paradox, and Shelley 's  ( 1 8401 1 967) "Defense of Poetry," which 
argues that poetry "creates anew the universe" (p. 483) are all concepts that fore­
shadowed the constructivist position on language. 
Identifying poets as seers and visionaries popular to Western stereotypes 
attests to an understanding that the metaphors of poetry do not stand as merely 
juxtaposed to logical descriptions of reality, but actually create a transcendent 
reality for reader consideration. In other words, the truth of language is located 
in its removal from the world-its otherworldliness.  The concept of objective 
reality makes a faulty backdrop for interpreting linguistic constructions. One 
contemporary humorist concisely settled the conflict between the objectivist and 
constructivist points of view: "In cases of major discrepancy [between literature 
and life] it's always reality that's got it  wrong . . . .  Reality is frequently inaccurate" 
(Adams, 1 980, p. 38). 
Just as any consideration of metaphor on a scale polarized between truth and 
falsity is untenable, so is any attempt to fix discriminations between the literal 
and the metaphorical. In the constructivist or experientialist view, literal and 
metaphorical expressions are not separate species but variants of a single breed­
human language. We cannot claim that metaphors are present in some texts and 
absent from others. All texts are rife with metaphors, a few arresting, most veiled 
in everyday use. This blurring of the literal/metaphorical distinction reflects the 
postmodern mischief which aims to deconstruct and level many of the pet valua­
tions in Western philosophy's  collection of hierarchical opposites, including true/ 
false, real/fictional, objective/subjective, and literal/metaphorical. 
A Constructivist Cosmology 
In the objectivist system, metaphor is considered the sole province of the 
literary mind that is interested in the subtleties and amenities of language. It is  
not. I t  is  at  the very core of our learning, thinking, and writing. Noting the 
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omnipresence of metaphor, Seitz ( 1 99 1 )  reminds the field of the futility of its 
recommendations that figurative expressions be replaced with literal explana­
tions ;  "we cannot catch up to the speed of figuration nor somehow hold it still 
with literal language" (p. 290). We have also seen that the literal can be called 
metaphorical, that metaphor can be taken literally, that through language humans 
create their own reality. To complete the circle, we can even claim, with Galeano 
( 1 989/ 1 99 1 ), that "[p]erhaps we are the words that tell us who we are" (p. 1 8)­
that it is  the language that has created the human. 
Biolinguists assert that language defines humans and separates them from the 
animal kingdom; words elevate us "above the silence of plants and the grunts of 
beasts" (Bartel, 1 983,  p.75) .  Dennett ( 1 99 1 )  refutes Wittgenstein's  comment: 
'"If a lion could talk, we could not understand him"' by claiming " [If] a lion 
could talk that lion would have a mind so different from the general run of lion 
minds, that although we could understand him just fine, we would learn little 
about ordinary lions from him" (as cited in Johnson, 1 99 1 ,  p. 60). To paraphrase 
Primo Levi ( 1 989), the "whine of an animal" is not a text (p. 1 72). While animals 
may s ignal  with their whimpers and whinni e s ,  their noises  are neither 
paraphrastic nor inventive. 
The equation of language with creation is  nearly as old as Western culture 
itself. The first chapter, third verse, of Genesis tells of a God who speaks cre­
ation (And God said, Let there be light: and there was light) and names our exis­
tential opposites, night and day, heaven and earth. The opening chapter of the 
Gospel of John, first verse, repeats this theme; "In the beginning was the Word, 
and the Word was with God, and the Word was God." The last verse of "The 
Revelation of John" lists those who will be excluded from messianic Jerusalem: 
"dogs, fortune tellers, and the sexually immoral, murderers, idolaters, and every­
one of false speech and false life," reflecting both a pre- and post-modern stance 
on the power of language to define reality. The kingdom of God is gained by 
utterance, not grace. 
The great prophets and mystics have always known this ,  and that is why the 
great religious texts are built on allegory, parable, proverb, and magical imagery. 
Jesus, Lao-Tzu, Muhammad, Siddhartha, the Zen Masters, and the Hasidic Zaddiks 
all worked from a tacit understanding that humans recoil from the bald truth, that 
seekers are more l ikely to accept new theological premises when they are 
presented indirectly. Often the new religious values are disguised in stories 
involving commonplace s i tuation s ,  such as  al legories  and parables ,  or  
paradoxical puzzlers like those found in the Old Testament book of "Proverbs," 
the Tao Te Ching, and Zen koans. 
Ben Shahn's ( 1 954) telling of the "The Alphabet of Creation," a legend from 
the Zohar, the Kabbalah ' s  primary mystical text, derived from ancient Gnostic 
tales begins: 
Twenty-six generations before the creation of the world, the twenty­
two letters of the alphabet descended from the crown of God whereon 
they were engraved with a pen of flaming fire. They gathered around 
about God and one after another spoke and entreated, each one, that 
the world be created through him. (pp. 1 -2) 
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According to the legend, the Lord chose to fashion the heavens and earth with 
the masculine Beth and the feminine Aleph. Aleph's selection was a reward for 
her modesty (a conceit that has had for millennia a profound effect on human 
expectations about women). 
In a recent article on quantum cosmology, Primack and Abrams ( 1 995) 
remind us of another account of creation involving language found in Jewish 
midrashic literature. "Genesis Rabbah 1 : 1  says :  'The Holy one in creating the 
universe, . . .  worked from a plan-the Torah' "  (p. 7 1 ) . Moreover, the notion that 
language can form the universe is not peculiar to the traditions of Judaeo­
Christian creationism. The Buddhist monks' chant, "Aouhm," vocalizes from 
back to front of the mouth, a gloss of all the speaking positions .  The gloss itself 
functions as an auditory metonymy, a symbolic reiteration of the act of creation. 
If, mythologically speaking,  language created the universe, and if we, as 
members of the universe, have been given power over language, then we, too, 
have been endowed with the power of creati on.  "The exerc ise  of human 
language enacts, albeit on a microscopically humble scale, the divine reflexes of 
creation, the Logos or ' speaking into being' of the universe" (Steiner, 1 97 1 ,  
p .  75) .  "One word can cripple a human relationship, can do dirt on hope" 
(Steiner, 1 989, p. 58). 
Language and metaphor are our human trust; through them we spell our 
v i sion of the now and the forever. As humans,  our nature is to use them 
constructively. As teachers, it i s  our responsibility to empower our students to 
use their linguistic and metaphorical birthrights to construct and re-construct their 
intellectual, political, and even their spiritual lives; for by their own metaphors 
will they be known and will they know. We must teach with the conviction of 
Vaclav Havel: "Transcendence is the only real alternative to extinction" (as cited 
in Primack & Abrams, 1 995,  p. 73).  If we fail in this obligation, we risk revert­
ing to the abyss of unspeakability. c::::J 
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